ISO/IEC 27001 — Information Security Management Systems
Last verified2026-10. The current edition is ISO/IEC 27001:2022 plus Amendment 1:2024. The transition from the 2013 edition ended on 31 October 2025, so any 2013 certificate still on offer has expired.
What is this?ISO/IEC 27001 is an international standard that describes how an organisation should run information security. It is a repeatable process: decide what you are protecting, find the risks, choose controls, check that they work, and improve. That process is called an ISMS (information security management system). The standard does not tell you to buy a firewall or use a particular cipher. It tells you to have a defensible reason for each control you run and evidence that it operates. An independent auditor checks this, and if you pass you get a certificate that customers ask for during procurement.
Why It Matters
In Europe, the UK and Asia, "Are you ISO 27001 certified?" is often the first line of a supplier security questionnaire. A certificate can replace hundreds of questionnaire answers.
NIS2 Article 21 measures, DORA's ICT risk framework and many national rules map closely onto ISO 27001. It is the usual way to show you meet them (see NIS2 and CRA & DORA).
Access reviews, vulnerability SLAs, logging retention and incident tickets all become audit evidence. Engineers are the people who produce that evidence, and the people asked for it when it is missing.
The usual question is not "list Annex A". It is "a certificate exists, so why did the breach still happen?" or "how would you scope an ISMS for a SaaS product?"
How It Works
The two halves of the standard
ISO/IEC 27001:2022
├── Clauses 4–10 ── the management system: REQUIRED, every clause, no exclusions
│ 4 Context who cares about us, what is in scope
│ 5 Leadership top management owns it, signs the policy
│ 6 Planning risk assessment, risk treatment, objectives
│ 7 Support people, competence, awareness, documents
│ 8 Operation actually run the risk process and the controls
│ 9 Evaluation monitoring, internal audit, management review
│ 10 Improvement nonconformities, corrective action
│
└── Annex A ── a menu of 93 controls you compare your choices against
5 Organizational (37) policy, roles, suppliers, cloud, incidents, BC
6 People (8) screening, awareness, remote working
7 Physical (14) perimeters, equipment, clear desk
8 Technological (34) access, crypto, logging, secure coding, backupClauses 4–10 use the Harmonized Structure shared by all ISO management-system standards (ISO 9001 for quality, ISO 22301 for business continuity). That is why an organisation can run one combined management system and pass one combined audit.
Annex A is not a checklist you must implement in full. You may exclude a control, but you have to justify the exclusion. A fully remote company with no office can exclude most physical-entry controls, provided it explains why and covers home working instead (6.7 remote working).
Memory hookclauses are the engine, Annex A is the parts catalogue. Every clause is mandatory, because without them nothing runs. You only fit the parts your risks call for, and you write down why you skipped the others.
The core loop: risk → controls → Statement of Applicability
This is the part interviewers probe most, because it is where the ISMS makes actual decisions.
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Define scopeLaneClause 4.3
- Which products, sites, teams, cloud accounts and interfaces are in?
- Write the boundary down: auditors test against this sentence
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Assess risksLaneClause 6.1.2
- List information assets and their owners
- Score likelihood × impact with a method you can repeat
- Compare against the risk acceptance criteria management approved
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Treat risksLaneClause 6.1.3
- Modify (add controls), avoid, share (insurance, contract), or retain
- Risk owners sign off the plan and accept the residual risk
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Statement of ApplicabilityLaneClause 6.1.3 d
- One line per Annex A control: applicable? implemented? why?
- The single document an auditor reads first
-
Operate, measure, reviewLaneClauses 8–10
- Internal audit, management review, corrective actions
- Repeat at planned intervals or when something significant changes
In practiceAn abridged Statement of Applicability (SoA) for a SaaS company. The justification column is what makes it defensible:
Control Applicable Status Justification / evidence
5.23 Information security for Yes Implemented All prod in AWS; R-014 provider compromise.
use of cloud services Evidence: cloud provider register, SCP baseline
7.4 Physical security monitoring No Excluded No company-owned premises; prod hosted by
cloud provider (covered by 5.23 + provider ISO cert)
8.16 Monitoring activities Yes Partial SIEM covers prod; corp laptops onboard Q1 ← gap
Treatment plan TP-07, owner: SecOps lead
8.28 Secure coding Yes Implemented R-021 injection. SAST gate in CI, PR review ruleAn auditor will pick the "Partial" line, ask for treatment plan TP-07 and check whether Q1 actually happened.
What changed in 2022
The 2013 edition had 114 controls in 14 domains. The 2022 edition merged them into 93 controls in 4 themes and added 11 new controls, all of them things modern attacks forced into scope:
Collect and use information about threats relevant to you
Security for buying, using and leaving cloud providers
IT recovery that matches the business continuity plan
Watch premises (CCTV, alarms) for unauthorised entry
Secure baselines for hardware, software, services and networks
Delete data when it is no longer needed
Mask or pseudonymise data according to policy and law
Detect and stop sensitive data leaving
Monitor networks, systems and apps for anomalous behaviour
Control access to external websites to reduce malicious content
Apply secure-coding principles in software development
Amendment 1 (2024) added one requirement to clauses 4.1 and 4.2: decide whether climate change is a relevant issue for your ISMS and whether stakeholders have climate-related requirements. Usually it shows up as a business-continuity risk, for example data-centre flooding or heat.
The family of standards
vocabulary.
guidance on how to implement each Annex A control. It also tags every control with attributes, including the NIST CSF style concepts Identify / Protect / Detect / Respond / Recover, which helps when you map ISO 27001 to NIST CSF.
information security risk management guidance.
extra controls for cloud services and for protecting personal data in public clouds.
privacy information management, used to show GDPR-style privacy governance.
rules for the certification bodies that audit you.
You certify against 27001 only. You cannot be "27002 certified", and if a vendor claims that, it is a red flag.
Mandatory documented information
Auditors expect these documents and records. If one is missing, that alone is a nonconformity:
- Scope of the ISMS (4.3) and the information security policy (5.2)
- Risk assessment process and results (6.1.2, 8.2), risk treatment process and results (6.1.3, 8.3)
- Statement of Applicability (6.1.3 d) and information security objectives (6.2)
- Evidence of competence (7.2) and of operational planning and control (8.1)
- Monitoring and measurement results (9.1)
- Internal audit programme and results (9.2) and management review results (9.3)
- Nonconformities and corrective actions (10.2)
Most Annex A controls also need evidence, for example access review records, but the standard does not list it as mandatory documentation.
The certification audit cycle
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌───────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌───────────────┐
│ Stage 1 │──►│ Stage 2 │──►│ Cert │──►│Surveill. │──►│Surveill. │──►│Recertification│
│ docs & │ │ controls │ │issued │ │ audit 1 │ │ audit 2 │ │ full audit, │
│ readiness│ │ operating│ │3 years│ │ (sample) │ │ (sample) │ │ new 3 years │
└──────────┘ └──────────┘ └───────┘ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ └───────────────┘
▲ │
└─ major NC? ───┘ close it (with evidence) before the certificate is issuedThe auditor reviews scope, SoA, risk assessment and policies to decide whether you are ready. Gaps found here are cheap to fix.
The auditor samples evidence that the controls operate: tickets, logs, review records, staff interviews.
A major nonconformity means a requirement is missing or has failed systemically, for example no internal audit at all. It blocks certification until it is closed. A minor nonconformity is an isolated lapse and needs a corrective-action plan. An opportunity for improvement is advice only.
in years 1 and 2 sample part of the ISMS. Recertification in year 3 covers it all again.
The auditing firm (the certification body) should be accredited by a national accreditation body that belongs to the IAF (International Accreditation Forum), for example UKAS in the UK, DAkkS in Germany, ANAB in the US or PCA in Poland. You can check a certificate in the IAF CertSearch database.
In practiceWhat a stage 2 evidence request looks like. Each line traces back to an SoA entry:
Audit sample request — Stage 2, Day 1
REQ-01 5.18 Access rights Last quarterly access review for prod AWS + GitHub org;
show 3 leavers from the HR list and the date their access was removed
REQ-02 8.8 Technical vulns Vulnerability SLA policy; 5 criticals from the scanner and fix dates
REQ-03 5.24 Incident mgmt Two closed incidents with timeline, lessons learned, actions
REQ-04 8.15 Logging Retention setting on prod log bucket; proof logs are tamper-protected
REQ-05 9.2 Internal audit Audit programme, last report, status of its findings🎯On the job. REQ-01 is where most engineering teams fail. Leavers are removed from the identity provider but keep a personal access token in GitHub or an IAM user in an old AWS account. Automate the joiner-mover-leaver flow and keep the review export, because the evidence has to exist before the auditor asks for it.
Security Angle
Certified does not mean secure
A certificate shows that a management system exists for the stated scope and that it operated on the days the auditor sampled. It does not show that every system is hardened. The common gaps are:
The certificate covers "the London office's HR processes", but the sales team presents it as covering the whole SaaS platform. Always read the scope statement on the certificate.
A policy says "MFA on all remote access". Nobody tests whether the old VPN concentrator actually enforces it.
The risks were copied from a template, every score is "medium", and nothing in the register changed after the last incident.
Annex A 5.19–5.22 require you to manage supplier risk. A supplier's own certificate does not cover how you integrate with that supplier.
📰Real incident — Change Healthcare (2024). In February 2024 attackers used stolen credentials to log in to a Citrix remote-access portal that had no multi-factor authentication. They moved inside for days, then deployed ransomware that stopped US prescription and claims processing for weeks. UnitedHealth's CEO confirmed the missing MFA in testimony to the US Congress. Lesson: "secure authentication" (8.5) has to be verified on every entry point, including systems inherited through an acquisition. An SoA line that says "Implemented" proves nothing if no one has checked it.
📰Real incident — MOVEit Transfer (2023, CVE-2023-34362). The Cl0p group mass-exploited a SQL injection flaw in Progress MOVEit Transfer, a file-transfer product. Data was stolen from thousands of organisations, many of which only used the product through a payroll or benefits supplier. Lesson: supplier controls (5.19–5.22) and cloud-service controls (5.23) must cover fourth parties. Knowing which of your suppliers run which internet-facing products is a risk-assessment input, not paperwork.
How defenders use the ISMS
Each high risk should map to a ticket, an owner and a date. If you cannot trace an engineering priority back to a risk, either the risk is missing or the work is not needed.
Clause 10.2 requires corrective action. After an incident, update the risk assessment and the SoA. Auditors look for that link, and so do attackers who reuse the same technique.
Ask the internal auditor to test the controls that matter, for example restoring a backup or checking that a leaver's tokens were revoked, not to re-read policies.
🎯On the job. When reviewing a vendor, ask for the certificate and the SoA (or an extract). The certificate tells you a body audited something. The scope and the SoA tell you whether your data's path is inside the boundary and which controls were excluded. Then confirm the certification body is accredited.
ISO 27001 vs Other Frameworks
| ISO 27001 | SOC 2 | NIST CSF 2.0 | NIS2 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| What it is | Management-system standard | Attestation report against trust services criteria | Voluntary framework | EU law |
| Who checks | Accredited certification body | Licensed CPA firm | Self-assessed | National authorities |
| Output | Certificate (3 years) | Type I or Type II report | Profiles / tiers | Fines, orders, liability |
| Typical market | Global, especially EU/UK/Asia | US | US public and private sector | EU essential and important entities |
A short comparison with SOC 2 is also in compliance frameworks.
Interview Q&A
It's the international standard for an information security management system: a repeatable loop where you scope what you protect, assess risks, pick controls, and prove through internal audit and management review that they work and improve. Clauses 4 to 10 are mandatory, while Annex A's 93 controls are a reference set you justify against in a Statement of Applicability. The point is that an accredited auditor certifies the process, which is why it shows up in almost every European supplier questionnaire.
It's the list of all 93 Annex A controls showing, for each one, whether it applies, whether it's implemented and why, tied back to the risk assessment. It's the bridge between "these are our risks" and "these are our controls", so an auditor uses it to choose what to sample. A good SoA explains exclusions, like dropping physical-entry controls for a fully remote company, rather than marking everything "yes".
The certificate proves a management system existed for a stated scope and operated on the days the auditor sampled, not that every system was hardened. Common gaps are a narrow scope, controls that exist on paper but aren't verified, and suppliers outside the boundary. Change Healthcare in 2024 is the classic example: one remote-access portal without MFA was enough. That's why I read the scope and the SoA, not just the certificate.
The 114 controls in 14 domains were consolidated into 93 controls in four themes, organizational, people, physical and technological, and 11 controls were added, including threat intelligence, cloud services, configuration management, data leakage prevention, monitoring activities and secure coding. The management-system clauses changed only a little. The transition deadline was 31 October 2025, so today only 2022 certificates are valid.
Agree the scope, run a risk assessment and treatment, write the SoA and mandatory documents, operate the controls long enough to have evidence, then run an internal audit and a management review. The certification body does Stage 1, a readiness and documentation review, then Stage 2, where it samples whether controls actually operate. Any major nonconformity must be closed before the three-year certificate is issued, and after that there are surveillance audits in years one and two and a recertification in year three.
Wire it into how engineering already works: each high risk becomes a ticket with an owner, and evidence such as access reviews, vulnerability SLAs and log retention is generated automatically from the tools, not screenshotted the week before the audit. After every incident I update the risk register and the SoA, because clause 10 requires corrective action anyway. Done that way, the audit becomes a by-product of running security well.
Scope it around what customers buy: the production platform, the teams and pipelines that change it, the cloud accounts it runs in and the people with access, and write the boundary and its interfaces down explicitly. Keeping it tight makes the first audit achievable, but it mustn't exclude anything customer data flows through, or the certificate becomes misleading. Cloud providers stay outside the boundary but are managed as suppliers under controls 5.19 to 5.23.
It depends on who you sell to. ISO 27001 gives a certificate for a management system and is what European and Asian buyers expect, while SOC 2 is a CPA's report on whether specific controls operated over a period, which US buyers expect. Most of the control work overlaps heavily, so companies often build one control set and get both.